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The archive · Commerce & Marketplaces · Product decision · 2018–2024

MarketForce's RejaReja bet: Africa's informal shops order by app; $42.5M, closed 2024

RejaReja's bet: mom-and-pop shops order FMCGs on an app and borrow against their history; 270k merchants at peak, closed April 2024.

MarketForce

The betThat informal shopkeepers would order FMCG stock through a super-app and borrow against transaction history — digitizing sub-Saharan Africa's mom-and-pop retail.No longer exists

What the business is

A Kenya-founded B2B marketplace (RejaReja) that lets mom-and-pop shops order stock from manufacturers and distributors in-app, pay digitally, and borrow against their order history.

Starting capital$42.5M total by Feb 2022 — a $40M Series A (half debt, half equity) led by V8 Capital Partners, after a $2M pre-Series A seven months earlier.

How it started

Founded in Kenya in 2018 by Tesh Mbaabu and Mesongo Sibuti as a SaaS platform for retail distribution, MarketForce launched the RejaReja merchant app in 2020 after seeing how informal traders — who move about 80% of sub-Saharan household retail — struggled with stockouts, unstable earnings and no financing.

What happened

A $40M Series A in Feb 2022 (total $42.5M) funded expansion to Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Nigeria plus a BNPL stock-financing pilot whose order value tripled; RejaReja aimed to grow merchants 2.5x to 250,000. By Aug 2022 it had 450,000+ orders and $200M+ annualized volume, yet cut 54 staff (~9%) to 'optimize for profitability'. A funding crunch — an investor reneging on a commitment — plus aggressive expansion and razor-thin FMCG margins then forced it out of Nigeria and Kenya, leaving Uganda last.

How it ended up

In April 2024 MarketForce wound down RejaReja — at its peak 800+ employees and 270,000 merchants — and pivoted to Chpter, an AI-powered conversational commerce platform for social selling.

Background

MarketForce is a Kenya-founded retail distribution company, started in 2018 by Tesh Mbaabu and Mesongo Sibuti as SaaS for formal retail. In 2020 it launched RejaReja, a merchant super-app where informal shopkeepers order fast-moving consumer goods directly from manufacturers and distributors, pay digitally and later borrow against their order history. The bet was that digitizing the ~80% of sub-Saharan household retail that flows through mom-and-pop stores would unlock both commerce and credit at scale.

The model was asset-light — no warehouses or trucks; partners delivered — and growth followed: by late 2021 RejaReja had 87,000+ orders at a $151 average basket and 40% month-on-month growth. In February 2022 it raised a $40M Series A (half debt, half equity) led by V8 Capital Partners, taking total funding to $42.5M, with plans to grow merchants 2.5x to 250,000 and double headcount to 800. A BNPL inventory-financing pilot tripled order value, pointing toward the fintech margins the company wanted.

The economics never matched the growth. FMCG retail runs on razor-thin, price-elastic margins; paying for inventory and extending credit made each merchant a cash consumer. In July 2022 MarketForce cut 54 staff (~9%) to 'optimize for profitability', then a funding crunch — an investor reneging on a commitment — plus aggressive expansion forced withdrawals from Nigeria and Kenya, leaving Uganda last. At its peak RejaReja employed 800+ people and served 270,000 merchants.

In April 2024 the company wound RejaReja down. It kept the underlying insight — that African merchants sell through chat and social channels — and pivoted to Chpter, an AI-powered conversational commerce platform. The case shows that in distribution, asset-light growth still has to fund working capital, and marketplace scale without unit economics is a funding event away from collapse.

What has to be true

  • It attacked a real, enormous market: ~80% of sub-Saharan household retail runs through informal shops, and RejaReja gave them direct ordering and transparent pricing for the first time.
  • The asset-light design (no warehouses, no trucks) let it scale from 5,000 to 270,000 merchants quickly, which made the growth story fundable.
  • Order history doubled as a credit profile, and the BNPL pilot's tripled order value suggested a path to fintech margins beyond the goods themselves.
  • Razor-thin, price-elastic FMCG margins meant volume growth did not equal profit; carrying credit risk made every new shop a cash consumer.
  • A reneged investor commitment exposed the fragility: with working capital gone, expansion reversed and the business wound down within two years of its peak.

What can be applied

Thin-margin FMCG distribution isn't won on volume: when the platform carries credit and inventory risk, every merchant adds cash burn, and a reneged investor turns growth into a cliff.

Aftermath

As of September 2, 2026, RejaReja remains closed and MarketForce no longer operates its B2B e-commerce arm. The company pivoted to Chpter, an AI-powered conversational commerce platform announced at the wind-down, which lets merchants sell through chat and social channels. No published reports show RejaReja returning; the broader African B2B-retail segment contracted in the same period, with rivals Wasoko and TradeDepot also scaling back.

Sources

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