What the business is
A mobile online-to-offline marketplace connecting Chinese consumers with restaurants, entertainment, travel and other local services.
The bet
Build China's dominant O2O platform from restaurant discovery, deals, delivery, travel and local services, then use a merger to outlast subsidy-heavy rivals.
Starting capital
Dianping's first venture round was $2M in April 2006; Meituan raised a $20M Series A in August 2010. By 2018, the combined company had raised more than $7.3B.
How it started
Tao Zhang founded Dianping in 2003 after seeing China's rising restaurant culture. It connected merchants with potential customers through reviews and charged vendors for search optimization. Wang Xing founded Meituan in 2010 during China's Groupon-copycat wave, beginning with daily deals.
What happened
Both companies raised heavily while the daily-deals market offered discounts averaging 60%. Dianping raised $100M in 2011 and $64M in 2012; Tencent bought a 20% stake in 2014 and integrated its services with WeChat. Meituan reached profitability in 2013, led the market by gross merchandise volume in October 2014, and raised $300M in May 2014 plus $700M in January 2015.
In October 2015, the former rivals announced a merger. Alibaba sold its minority stake after the deal, while the combined business became the dominant player in daily deals and expanded across O2O categories.
How it ended up
By mid-2018, Meituan-Dianping was described as China's fourth-largest unicorn, with a valuation around $30B after raising more than $7.3B. It was investing in other startups and considering a Hong Kong IPO, but the IPO was still a plan rather than a completed outcome.
What has to be true
The founders chose narrow, complementary entry points—trusted restaurant discovery and measurable daily deals—before broadening into local services.
Large rounds and strategic backing from Sequoia, Alibaba and Tencent gave the companies time to survive a market where average discounts reached 60%.
The October 2015 merger combined two strong but cash-burning positions instead of making both platforms keep subsidizing the same O2O customers and merchants.
The merged platform could cross-sell food, hotels, tickets and other services while consolidating network effects and capital.
What can be applied
In a marketplace war that makes standalone economics impossible, adjacent wedges can be stronger together—but consolidation only works when the combined platform still solves a real local problem.
Aftermath
At the article's mid-2018 cutoff, Meituan-Dianping had become a $30B-scale, fourth-largest Chinese unicorn after more than $7.3B in capital. It was investing in adjacent startups and verticals such as ridesharing, and was weighing a Hong Kong IPO rather than reporting one as completed.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- How Former Rivals Became China's Fourth Largest Unicorn On The Cusp Of An IPO news.crunchbase.com
- Chinese Local Review Site Dianping: A Lot More Than A Yelp For China venturebeat.com
- China's Daily Deals Market Share Statistics techinasia.com
- China's Meituan Is Said To Plan $6 Billion IPO Filing This Month bloomberg.com